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Abstract: In the aftermath of unification, 
the Canadian Forces were struggling 
to  deal  with  the changes that 
overtook them, not least the Trudeau 
government’s relative indifference to 
the military, the impact of bilingualism, 
and massive reorganizations. General 
Jacques Dextraze, who became chief 
of the defence staff in 1972 and Sylvain 
Cloutier, the deputy minister in the 
Department of National Defence from 
1971 to 1975, played key roles in 
managing the changes. Interviews 
conducted by J.L. Granatstein in 1988 
indicate where they agreed – and 
disagreed – and tell us much about the 
characters of these two key figures.
In 1988, Robert Bothwell and I were completing our research for the 
final volume in the Canadian Institute 
of International Affairs’ series Canada 
in World Affairs. As the concluding 
volume in the long-lived series, the 
ordinary two-year time span was 
abandoned; instead, the book was 
to cover the 1968 to 1984 period, 
or, in other words, all of Prime 
Minister Pierre Trudeau’s foreign 
and defence policy (as well as the Joe 
Clark interregnum). Moreover, it had 
been many years since the preceding 
volumes had appeared. This delay 
gave us the opportunity to make 
use of a wider range of manuscript 
sources than in most of the earlier 
volumes, and we secured access to a 
very broad spectrum of government 
and private papers. 
 We also conducted almost two 
hundred interviews, some together, 
others alone. Two that I did myself 
were with “Jadex”, General Jacques 
Dextraze, the great fighting soldier 
who became chief of the defence staff 
in 1972, and with Sylvain Cloutier, the 
deputy minister in the Department 
of National Defence from 1971 to 
1975. Dextraze had led units with 
distinction during the Second World 
War and in Korea, been chief of staff 
to the UN operation in the Congo, 
served as chief of operations at 
Mobile Command and then as chief 
of personnel at National Defence 
Headquarters before becoming CDS. 
Cloutier, his civilian colleague in 
arms, was commissioner of the public 
service, deputy secretary of the 
treasury board and deputy minister 
of taxation in the Department of 
National Revenue before going to 
DND as deputy minister.
 I n  t h e  a f t e r m a t h  o f 
unification, the Canadian Forces 
were struggling to deal with the 
changes that overtook them, not 
least the Trudeau government’s 
relative indifference to the military, 
the impact of bilingualism, and 
massive reorganizations. Dextraze 
and Cloutier played key roles in 
managing the changes, and these 
interviews indicate where they 
agreed – and disagreed – and tell us 
much about the characters of these 
two key figures.
 As was my regular practice, I took 
notes during these long conversations 
rather than using a tape recorder. 
Immediately after each interview, 
I typed up a memorandum, not a 
transcript, of the discussions. These 
memoranda were used as sources 
for Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and 
Canadian Foreign Policy, published 
by the University of Toronto Press 
in 1990, and are reproduced below 
with a few excisions and with 
minor stylistic and grammatical 
corrections. The memoranda can 
be found in Bothwell’s papers in 
the University of Toronto archives 
and in the Granatstein fonds at the 
York University archives, along with 
memoranda of all the interviews 
conducted for the book. Copies of 
the memoranda are also deposited at 
the Canadian War Museum and the 
Directorate of History and Heritage, 
NDHQ.
* * * * *
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Interview with Sylvain 
Cloutier, Ottawa,  
20 January 1988
His interest in DND started in 1968 when he was at the 
Treasury Board [as deputy secretary]. 
He was trying to change the form of 
the estimates to give them structure, 
to present them in a manner that 
combined legal and financial sides 
and assisted management in setting 
and reporting on objectives. DND 
despite unification was still three 
services with civilian and military 
components. He grouped all votes 
under a single programme (except 
the Defence Research Board) and 
started cutting fat off the estimates 
of which there was a lot. The DND 
structure wasn’t geared to its mission, 
and this was a period of scandals 
(e.g., the HMCS Bonaventure refit).
 Then in 1971 he was told he was 
going to DND as deputy minister 
by Gordon Robertson [clerk of the 
privy council]. The government 
wanted a hard manager and Donald 
Macdonald [the minister of national 
defence] also wanted him. He didn’t 
know Don well, but as deputy 
secretary of the Treasury Board, he 
and Macdonald attended some of 
the same Cabinet committees. His 
mandate was to make DND work.
 Cloutier arrived in September 
1971 and found the management 
review group (MRG) in operation 
under John Pennefather [and trying 
to mesh the civil and military parts of 
DND]. Macdonald told him to take 
an interest in the MRG’s operations, 
and as he thought DND had to be 
re-directed he was glad to do so. The 
MRG could be the way to change 
direction. But by the time it reported 
in early 1972 Macdonald was gone 
and Edgar Benson was filling in. 
By then Cloutier had his own ideas 
on how to run DND, and the re-
structure he imposed was not that 
recommended by the MRG, although 
in line with its philosophy.
 Cloutier decided there had to be 
a strong chief of the defence staff. 
General F.R. Sharp was retiring in 
1972 and he wasn’t a strong manager, 
something Cloutier had decided by 
Christmas 1971. Jacques Dextraze 
was strong, and Cloutier got the 
government to name him CDS-
designate early in 1972 so he and 
Cloutier could get underway as soon 
as possible. Sharp, he said, was a fine 
man who went along with the new 
direction but left the hard decisions 
for Jadex to handle. In the end, Sharp 
was sent on tour for the last months 
of his term.
 Within a month, Cloutier had 
a key meeting with the minister, 
CDS, etc., and started the restructure 
rolling. It took 2-3 months to put flesh 
on the bones – the submission to 
Treasury Board was 2-3 inches thick. 
The concepts put forward by Cloutier 
were novel and predicated on the 
basis of friendship and cooperation 
between the CDS and the deputy. 
He and Dextraze worked closely for 
five years and never once disagreed 
in public. When they fought it was 
in private; at a meeting, if they 
disagreed, they’d kick each other 
under the table and change the 
subject. Now there was resistance 
to having the deputy with such 
power – co-equal to the CDS, same 
rank, same pay – but the deputy was 
responsible for DND management 
and the CDS for the operations of the 
forces. Certainly Cloutier never gave 
an order to the forces – if that was 
necessary, he’d get the CDS to do it.
 What he did do was to integrate 
activities which had been parallel in 
the three services or parallel in the 
military and civilian components 
of the deputy’s office. The deputy’s 
office had about 200 personnel when 
he took over; after the change, it had 
three or four. He created structures 
that let the CDS and the deputy both 
use them – this eliminated hassles 
and sped up the process.
 The Defence Research Board 
(DRB) was a crown corporation 
with its own budget and it did what 
it wanted. To Cloutier, DRB had 
to be made to do what the military 
wanted. In two stages, DRB was 
absorbed, leaving only an advisory 
board which was soon eliminated. 
The chief scientist became a senior 
officer under the ADM Materiel. This 
gave better resource management 
and made DRB serve military needs.
 Cloutier also did a re-structure 
of the Canadian Forces Commands. 
He created Air Command which was 
negotiated between he and Jadex, 
then done. He brought in General 
Chester Hull, a big, tough, first class 
man and the best manager in the CF 
to be vice chief of the defence staff 
(VCDS) – talked him out of retiring 
by saying this was the biggest job in 
the country. He managed to shuffle 
General Michael Dare, the previous 
VCDS with whom he didn’t agree, off 
to the Privy Council Office. For e.g., 
in 1972 the government wanted to cut 
budgets and asked departments to 
suggest cuts. Cloutier asked Dare for 
suggestions, and his first offering was 
to eliminate the reserves and save $30 
million. Cloutier, horrified, could see 
the political fallout and refused.
 In the first year he restructured 
DND and changed the management. 
He brought in Lew Crutchlow from 
Treasury Board to be ADM Materiel 
and Tom Gregg from business to head 
the finance side. He created military 
associate DMs (three star officers) 
in materiel and finance, but not in 
personnel where the military was on 
top and a civilian was associate DM.
 To him, the military wasn’t 
spec ia l .  The  management  o f 
resources and people was the same 
as elsewhere.
 This reorganization created 
resentment, largely at the novelty of 
what he was doing, and at the fear 
that civilians were taking charge. It 
wasn’t true, however; the civilians 
were just making an appropriate 
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contribution. The proof of that was 
when Cloutier left in 1975 the system 
didn’t change. There was a different 
style but his system survived. There 
was a strong respect for authority in 
DND, and that helped. There were 
also problems with the civilians 
outside DND. At Treasury Board, the 
secretary, Al Johnson, didn’t believe 
in the changes, but Cloutier dealt 
with him by calling a meeting where 
military and civilians talked for three 
hours with Johnson and swung him 
round. It wasn’t Cloutier—it was 
“we” at DND.
 But he wouldn’t have succeeded 
without Dextraze. They worked the 
system out together and started on 
this the first night they met at a mess 
dinner at Rockcliffe. They then went 
to Cloutier’s house and drank crème 
de menthe together until 3 am. That 
persuaded them they could work 
together.
 At one meeting in the summer of 
1972, he and Jadex and General Ross, 
the senior personnel officer, plotted 
postings for the next ten years. All 
the CDSs for the next decade were 
on that list, and they determined the 
kind of experience generals needed to 
prepare for the top. Ramsey Withers, 
e.g., they decided needed policy 
experience and command of a large 
front-end command. They gave him 
both.
 The big flaw in DND was in 
programme development which 
was tough as there was no money. 
In the pre-Cloutier period, a service 
developed a programme, then put it 
to the deputy minister who had to 
re-do it all over again (for how could 
the deputy OK something without 
going through it?). In his early days 
at DND, Cloutier said he got a huge 
stack of paper to justify the purchase 
of 48 Boeing 707 aircraft. This wasn’t 
on the budget which was frozen. Why 
48?, he asked Sharp. The Orions had 
to be replaced and they needed twice 
as many anti-submarine warfare 
aircraft. Was this documented? No, 
but we need twice as many. Cloutier 
refused to sign.
 He cited a 1973 example when the 
Navy made a case to replace the old 
destroyers [DDHs]. They started the 
staff work and made a presentation 
in two parts: on the ships they then 
had and on their personnel. Dextraze 
said what Cloutier wanted to hear. 
The Navy should prepare a new 
presentation relating their mission 
to the ships they needed. The Navy 
always thought in terms of where 
they’d been – history, in other words 
– not of their mission. That was why 
the frigate programme took so long. 
Dextraze’s view was that you might 
have fewer toys for the boys to play 
with, but at least you’d have more 
efficient utilization of resources.
 What Cloutier did was to create 
a programmes chief, always 2-star 
military, and integrated him under 
the civilians who worked in the 
Deputy Minister’s office. This way 
the financial concerns of the civilians 
could be brought to bear on the 
process, and this worked well and 
faster as capital programmes had to be 
gone through once only. Eventually 
the 707 became the Aurora and 48 
became 18. He had forced the military 
to measure the capacity of the aircraft 
against the need. In his view, the 
military could choose an aircraft. But 
he had to insist on testing that choice 
against the economic priorities of the 
government and its international 
commitments. If you bore those in 
mind then you could get Supply 
and Services, External Affairs, and 
Trade and Commerce on side, and 
the submission to Cabinet would be a 
complete piece of work that answered 
all the questions. That way you got 
your proposals accepted.
 His aim was to marry resources 
to purposes; otherwise you misused 
resources. When he took over, the 
capital budget was 12 percent of the 
DND budget; his goal was to get 
it up to 22 percent. Indeed he got 
the DND budget increased within 
six months – with a $125 million 
pay raise, the first since the freeze. 
That was his first priority (“I’m not 
dumb”). He was also able to get the 
OK for things DND couldn’t have 
got before. For example, though 
Trudeau disliked tanks, he got a 
decision for armoured cars reversed. 
They were good for nothing, and 
he got tanks back. Don Macdonald 
[by then finance minister] told him 
“that’s not why we put you there.” 
Cloutier replied, “You should have 
told me.” He had asked the military 
what tank was best and they had said 
Chieftains or Leopards. At the same 
time, the Germans were negotiating 
to train at Shilo, Manitoba. He found 
out the Germans would rent tanks 
and although the Canadians didn’t 
like this, the choice was rent or none. 
As it worked out, they rented tanks 
initially then bought them, and they 
could use the German tanks at Shilo 
when the Jerries weren’t.
 DND didn’t have the people it 
needed to carry out its commitments. 
A s  a  r e s u l t ,  a l l  u n i t s  w e r e 
undermanned. Each day they’d meet 
for “morning prayers” and report on 
readiness. But Cloutier asked “ready 
for what?” They started examining 
Sylvain Cloutier
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the shadow establishments, then 
deciding what they needed as war 
establishments, then what they 
could afford. This was a beginning 
on a White Paper process, a way of 
demonstrating with sound analysis 
the gap between what they had and 
what they needed. Cloutier claimed 
there was no evidence of decline in 
military capability.
 He had created ADM Policy in 
an attempt to get DND more clout 
with External Affairs which hitherto 
had made policy and told DND to 
implement it. The implementer has 
to have a large role in making policy, 
and that was why the change. He also 
started loaning bright young officers 
to Treasury Board and bringing 
Treasury Board people into DND. 
Later programmes were easier to 
push through as a result.
 Ministers: He had 26 ministers 
from 1965 in all his portfolios. 
[Defence minister] James Richardson 
[1972-76] was a “horse’s ass” and 
Jadex and he spent a lot of time 
trying to prevent him doing stupid 
things. Cloutier was so despairing 
at one point that when he ran into 
Trudeau at a party, he asked to be 
moved from DND and told him 
why. Trudeau said he had the same 
reaction to Richardson, but said 
that Cloutier was in DND because 
he trusted him. Richardson was a 
small mind, impressed with his own 
public relations. He would only make 
speeches if Cloutier wrote them. Nor 
was he sympathetic to bilingualism 
which Cloutier spent much time 
on. In November 1972, Richardson 
asked him what he was doing. 
“Bilingualism.” “It’s not a priority.” 
“It’s mine,” Cloutier said. Richardson 
tried to stall proposals like the French-
language training centre at St. Jean, 
sitting on the memo for three weeks. 
Cloutier again met Trudeau and told 
him Richardson was holding this up 
while other ministers were asking 
for it. Trudeau replied he should 
make an effort in the next week 
to get Richardson to sign but if he 
wouldn’t then he, Trudeau, would. 
As it turned out Richardson did sign. 
The Minister also wanted to close 
CFB Suffield and move the scientists 
to his own Winnipeg riding. Cloutier 
got Cabinet to block this. He was the 
worst minister he ever served.
 He had known Trudeau a long 
time and knew he wasn’t keen on 
DND. It took two years to get the 
principle established that the capital 
share of the budget should be 25 
percent, and by the time he left DND 
in May 1975 he had the 3 percent 
above inflation [annual budget 
increase] through. The structure he 
and Jadex developed was designed 
to deal with Trudeau – time couldn’t 
be wasted in having civilians and 
military in DND fighting each other.
* * * * *
General J.A. Dextraze 
interview, Ottawa, 12 April 
1988.
We began with unification. He favoured integration but 
disliked unification which he feared 
would ruin the forces. His view 
was that men fought because of 
regimental loyalties, for their friends 
and not for their country. Unification 
could hurt this. [Paul] Hellyer was 
advised by three air officers, [William] 
Lee, [Edwin] Reyno, and [F.R.] 
Sharp, and the air people simply 
didn’t understand the navy-army 
unit feeling. But he didn’t resign. 
[Admiral William] Landymore was 
stupid to do so. What you do is fight 
against, lose, and try to make the new 
system work. That was what he did 
as a 24-year-old battalion commander 
in Italy when his brigadier told him 
to attack where he didn’t want to. 
Still, he said, unification didn’t hurt 
his Mobile Command units in 1967 
[sic: 1968].
 He was asked to be VCDS to 
Sharp. He said no. Then he was 
offered the CDS job (instead of 
[General Michael] Dare) by [acting 
minister Edgar] Benson...which 
surprised him as he thought he 
was going to Mobile Command. He 
said yes, and it was announced the 
next day (April 1972). Sharp was in 
the Far East. Dextraze took over in 
September.
 When he became CDS he applied 
himself to openly de-unifying where 
he could – naval ranks, uniforms on 
ships and abroad, individual ship 
names on caps. He didn’t want new-
old uniforms – he could do better 
things with $50 million.
 Air Command was his idea. He 
told [James] Richardson all air should 
be under one command for training, 
maintenance, and procurement, 
but naval helicopters, e.g., would 
be under command of Maritime 
Command. It was logical but it did 
cause fights. It would be easier if each 
environment had its own air element 
but that was costly.
 As CDS, he said, he travelled to 
the troops in the field. The VCDS ran 
the HQ. He took a sergeant with him 
to make notes on decisions so there 
could be follow up.
 He and Sylvain Cloutier had 
met and talked over the necessity 
of ending the civil-military clash in 
DND. The forces had been unified, 
and now the civil-military operations 
at NDHQ had to be unified. It was 
clear the minister had to be at the 
top, the deputy minister and the 
CDS together in the box immediately 
below. The running of the forces was 
the CDS’ job, and the deputy was to 
support the CDS in getting what he 
needed. Syl didn’t like this but was 
persuaded.
 H e  a n d  C l o u t i e r  d i d  t h e 
integration of the civilian and 
military streams at NDHQ. They 
were both honest, cooperated, didn’t 
fight in public but went at each other 
in private. At meetings, Dextraze 
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was in the chair with Syl on the left, 
and the VCDS on the right. If they 
disagreed in a meeting, the decision 
was delayed until they could resolve 
it in private. Once in one private 
argument Cloutier broke down and 
cried and Dextraze took him in his 
arms and comforted him. He then 
talked to Syl’s wife, found out he was 
ill, and bugged him into seeing the 
quacks. It was clear they really liked 
each other. He remarked on how Syl 
would agree to divide subjects at 
Cabinet Committee presentations but 
then leap into Dextraze’s areas. Once 
Trudeau smiled and asked Dextraze 
what he had to say. “After hearing 
Admiral Cloutier..., “ he began. But 
this was just Syl’s style. There was a 
kind of shyness in Cloutier. Dextraze 
thought he admired Dextraze’s power 
and strength and his making him do 
things. Cloutier was a schemer which 
was good, someone who could make 
things happen.
 He had made an error in the way 
they divvied up posts at NDHQ under 
the integrated system. ADM jobs 
were to be interchangeable except 
for finance. Syl wanted policy too but 
Dextraze refused. The problem was 
the civilians were now taking over 
at NDHQ because the spots weren’t 
fixed in concrete. Certainly the old 
system didn’t work. The civilians 
fought the military and DND never 
got anywhere at Treasury Board 
where the deputy ministers always 
preferred the word of [Cloutier’s 
predecessor, Elgin] Armstrong – 
really difficult to deal with – over that 
of the military.
 As for who ran things, he or Syl, 
Dextraze was convinced he did. They 
worked together but it was his show. 
I asked how he reacted to comments 
that Cloutier had conned him. He was 
amused (sort of) and said that so long 
as he got what he wanted, and he did, 
people could think that.
 He talked about tanks. Trudeau 
didn’t want any, and Dextraze told 
him if that was the case get the 
troops off the NATO central front. 
Don Macdonald also didn’t want 
tanks or fighter aircraft. Eventually 
Trudeau agreed to tanks in Europe, 
but Dextraze persuaded him there 
had to be some here for training. 
Which tanks? He preferred US ones 
if they could be secured (as the US 
was the closest source of supply) 
but the US Army was in the midst of 
developing a new main battle tank. 
He had to get rid of the Centurion and 
the new UK tank was too heavy. The 
Germans were re-equipping with the 
Leopard I (the II was on the drawing 
boards), so he saw the German CDS 
with whom he was friendly and 
persuaded him to arrange a meeting 
with the German defence minister. 
He told the minister he needed only 
a hundred or so, that these could 
be found by giving German units 
a few less. He got him to agree by 
stressing that Trudeau was usually 
in disagreement with everything, but 
that he had agreed to a new tank (he 
was sure Trudeau thought Dextraze 
couldn’t get new tanks). As a result, 
Dextraze sent his ADM Materiel to 
Germany and it was all worked out.
 Trudeau, he said, was not really 
anti-military. Honest, hard-working, 
with his own ideas of what was 
best. If you couldn’t persuade him 
otherwise, he would do what he 
wanted. People were afraid of him, 
but not Dextraze. He usually saw him 
once or twice a year – in a crunch.
 D e x t r a z e  w a s  f u n n y  o n 
Richardson as minister. He had 
admiration for him, a good fellow, 
well-meaning. But he was a dummy, 
a racist, and was absent when brains 
were handed out. Dextraze said they 
fought on French-English questions, 
and he said, “Do you think you 
can just bury six million French 
Canadians? They won’t lie down.” 
Jim would reply by talking about the 
costs of having two languages. “So 
just speak French,” Dextraze replied. 
He was weak in the House, so weak 
that he couldn’t defend himself and 
the Opposition laid off out of pity.
 When they disagreed, Dextraze 
would say he wanted to see the 
prime minister. Richardson said no, 
but the CDS, Dextraze insisted, had 
the right to do so. One day Dextraze 
wrote Richardson a letter to tell him 
that he knew he wanted to be a good 
minister and could be one by doing 
the following x points. He made only 
one copy and sent the letter by hand. 
The minister then called him and 
Dextraze went over with his copy 
which Richardson tore out of his 
hand and ripped up. “The letter has 
never been received.” But the next 
day, being a good fellow, Richardson 
called up to say he couldn’t sleep and 
to apologize. He and Cloutier had 
to plot together on how to deal with 
Richardson. When Jim resigned he 
called Dextraze in Brussels to tell him 
he was going. Dextraze urged him to 
wait until he got home, but the next 
day he read that he’d quit.
 [Barney] Danson [minister 1976-
79] was much better. He had been a 
fighting soldier, understood troops 
and vice versa.
 Don Macdonald he liked for 
his hard work. As Finance minister, 
however, he had bitterly opposed the 
new tanks and was really annoyed 
when Dextraze kept plugging for 
Jacques Dextraze.
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them and finally succeeded. But as 
defence minister, Macdonald didn’t 
push for cuts in NATO.
 The armoured cars in Canada 
he knew weren’t great things. Lousy 
75 mm gun, etc. But they were all he 
could get, could be used to train tank 
crews, and they had utility in civil 
disorders.
* * * * *
In the four decades since Sylvain Cloutier and Jacques Dextraze 
worked  toge ther  a t  na t iona l 
defence, the verdict on the Trudeau 
government’s handling of the 
Canadian Forces has been harshly 
rendered. The shock of unification 
was profound, and it was followed 
by the only slightly lesser impact 
of  bi l ingualism on a hitherto 
mostly-unilingual military. Add to 
that budget freezes, increasingly 
obsolescent equipment, and the 
general impact of the unpopular 
Vietnam War on the way the military, 
even the Canadian military, was 
perceived by the public, and it was 
a dark time indeed. But even rapid 
change must be managed, and the 
deputy minister and the chief of the 
defence staff did their jobs well.
 The  re la t ionship  between 
Cloutier and Dextraze was a close 
one, as these interviews show, even 
though each man was convinced 
that he was the directing force, 
the dominant player. Scholars can 
form their own opinions over, for 
example, who created the idea of 
Air Command or who persuaded the 
government to secure new tanks, and 
they will likely be as divided in their 
views as were senior officers who 
worked in NDHQ during the 1970s. 
What is clear is that the two men 
integrated the civilian and military 
sides of the department, changed the 
way the headquarters functioned, 
and secured rather more funding 
and equipment for the Canadian 
Forces than seemed possible from 
a prime minister who was cool to 
the military and a finance minister 
who tried very hard to keep defence 
spending down This was a major 
achievement, one that could not have 
been accomplished if the CDS and the 
deputy minister had not cooperated 
closely. No one could have made the 
1970s a time of glowing achievement 
for the Canadian Forces, but matters 
could have been much worse. That 
might be a tepid comment, but it is 
intended as a compliment to Dextraze 
and Cloutier who served Canada and 
the Canadian Forces well.
J.L. Granatstein is the author of the second 
edition of Canada’s Army: Waging War and 
Keeping the Peace (University of Toronto 
Press, 2011).
Chief of the Defence Staff General Jacques Dextraze (right) 
during a visit to Baffin Island in the Canadian north, circa 1972.
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